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Abstract 
 
The literature has identified credit expansions to the private sector as an important 
predictor of financial crises in developing countries. We extend the literature by 
decomposing credit into credit extended to households and credit extended to firms. We 
compile a unique disaggregated data set and find evidence that household credit growth 
and firm credit growth have positive, distinct, and statistically significant effects on the 
likelihood of banking and currency crises. Furthermore, household credit growth is a 
particularly important predictor of banking crises in countries with a high propensity to 
consume.  
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1. Introduction 
 Rapid growth in bank credit to the private sector is a common factor associated 
with financial crises in developing countries. While an expansion of credit can be 
beneficial for economic development in the long-run,1 it may lead to macroeconomic 
disbalances and poor credit allocation in the short and medium term. There is abundant 
empirical evidence that credit expansions are often followed by banking crises and 
currency crises (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 1997; Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart 
1998; Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999).2  
We build on these studies by investigating how the components of private credit 
affect the likelihood of financial crises. In particular, we differentiate between household 
credit and firm credit. The literature has used the growth of total credit to the private 
sector, household and firm credit combined, as a predictor of crises but not separately. 
Yet, expansions of the two types of credit present distinct concerns for policymakers. 
Hilbers et. al (2005) point out that distinguishing between household and firm credit is a 
“key element” in evaluating the risks associated with credit expansions. To break down 
total private credit into household and firm credit, we use data from the national central 
banks of thirteen emerging economies. We find evidence that firm credit growth and 
household credit growth each increases the probability of a currency and a banking crisis. 
                                                 
1 King and Levine (1993a, b), Levine (1997), and Levine et al. (2000) among others provide evidence for a 
statistically significant and economically important effect of financial system development on economic 
growth.  
2 For example, the IMF (2004) estimates that about three-fourths of the periods of rapid credit growth in 
emerging markets are associated with a subsequent banking crisis and almost seven-eights are associated 
with a currency crisis. 
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Furthermore, household credit expansions combined with a low national propensity to 
save are an even stronger predictor of banking crises.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical differences 
and similarities between household credit and firm credit as pertaining to financial crises. 
Section 3 describes the data and the crisis definitions. Sections 4 and 5 present the 
empirical model and the estimation results, respectively. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Credit Expansions and Financial Crises: Theoretical Background and Review of                            
the Empirical Evidence 
Credit expansions can lead to financial crises through three channels: 1) by 
creating external macroeconomic disbalances; 2) by inflating asset bubbles; and 3) by 
leading to inefficient use of resources.3 Starting with the first channel, rapid credit growth 
can lead to a current account deficit if the demand for goods fueled by it cannot be 
satisfied by domestic supply. Generally, household credit growth raises the demand for 
consumption goods whereas firm credit growth raises the demand for investment goods. 
The difference is important because borrowing to finance consumption does not add to 
the long-term productive capacity of an economy and to greater export earnings (Frankel 
and Rose 1996). Therefore, a boom in the demand for consumption goods could be 
particularly problematic. There is ample evidence that an increase in household credit 
leads to an increase in consumption (Ludvigson 1999; Bacchetta and Gerlach 1997), 
reduced savings (Japelli and Pagano 1994) and current account deficits (Muellbauer and 
                                                 
3 See Kaminsky and Schmuckler (2003) for a comprehensive chronology of financial liberalizations. Credit 
expansions might be the result of financial liberalization policies that reduce reserve requirements, increase 
competition in the banking system, and liberalize international capital flows. They might also arise from an 
imperfectly credible exchange-rate based stabilization (Calvo 1986) or from implicit and explicit bailout 
guarantees (Corsetti et al. 1999a; Schneider and Tornell 2004).  
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Murphy 1990; Miles 1992). In the context of emerging economies, expectations of future 
instability can also lead to a consumption boom and current account deficits  as 
consumption is shifted from the future to the present (Calvo 1986). This process can be 
facilitated by the availability of credit.  
The consumption boom that results from rapid credit growth can be particularly 
strong in countries with traditionally low savings rates. In these economies, the relaxation 
of credit constraints raises household indebtedness without boosting significantly future 
income, thus increasing default risks (see Antzoulatos 1996 and Copelman 1996 for 
analyses of this phenomenon in Latin America). Another consequence of a low national 
savings rate is that the credit booms are financed by international capital inflows, which 
also raises the potential for financial crises (McKinnon and Pill 1997). Conversely, firm 
credit growth lowers the cost of external finance to firms in countries with low saving 
rates and scarce capital. Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that a higher level of financial 
development helps financially dependent firms grow faster thus leading to higher 
investment and growth. The empirical specifications discussed in the following sections 
include an interaction term of household credit growth and firm credit growth with 
savings rates to test whether savings rates influence the effect of credit growth on crises 
as these studies suggest.    
Turning to the asset price bubbles channel for crises, Bernanke et al. (1999) focus 
on the role of credit market frictions in business fluctuations. In their “financial 
accelerator” framework, endogenous developments in credit markets work to amplify and 
propagate shocks to the economy. During a boom, credit expands and asset prices 
increase, which in turn increases borrowers’ net worth and leads to new lending and even 
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higher asset prices. During a bust, the borrowers are not able to repay their loans and 
defaults increase. Allen and Gale (2000) also explore the role of credit expansions in 
creating asset bubbles using an asset pricing model. Their model explains the existence of 
bubbles by the inability of lenders to observe the riskiness of borrowers’ investment 
projects. Borio and Lowe (2002) show that sustained rapid credit growth combined with 
growth in asset prices increases the probability of a financial crisis.  
It is not clear whether household credit growth or firm credit growth fuel the 
financial accelerator process more strongly. However, the channels are likely to be 
different. A large portion of household credit is mortgage credit; therefore its rapid 
growth might result in inflated residential real estate prices, especially if households have 
limited access to alternative investment options such as a well developed domestic stock 
market (Bank for International Settlements 2005). McKinnon and Pill (1997,1998), for 
example, discuss that the rapid growth in certain types of household lending, particularly 
real estate finance and consumer credit, have been more problematic than others. 
Conversely, growth in firm credit might be associated with growth in commercial real 
estate prices and/or equity prices, both of which have been associated with crises (Borio 
and Lowe 2002).  
 The third channel for crises (the inefficient use of resources) refers to the 
difficulties faced by overburdened loan officers to price loans appropriately when the 
volume of new loans created is increasing rapidly. “Evergreening” might also be 
prevalent, i.e. new loans are used to service old loans. Furthermore, the temporary 
economic boom spurred by credit-driven consumption and investment growth might be 
misperceived as a long-term shift in the economic potential of the economy (Duenwald et 
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al. 2005). Overoptimistic expectations of future income might lead to greater 
indebtedness and defaults.  
These problems could arise from both household and firm credit growth. 
However, the literature has discussed the issue primarily in terms of firm credit. For 
example, Corsetti et al. (1999a, b), Krugman (1998), and Scheider and Tornell (2004) 
argue that implicit and explicit bailout guarantees contributed to overinvestment, 
excessive borrowing, and current account deficits in Southeast Asia by inducing private 
borrowers and lenders to develop and carry out risky projects. This system, characterized 
by moral hazard, lack of transparency, and inefficient monitoring of projects, unraveled 
into a financial crisis when the low profitability of past investments and the shaky 
foundations of investment strategies became apparent. It is possible that the literature has 
focused mostly on firm credit because much of the household credit involves collateral 
(real estate) and therefore requires less precise judgments on the part of loan officers. 
Poor judgment might be less costly unless there is a large drop in real estate prices, a 
sharp increase in unemployment or a sharp increase in interest rates (while long-term 
credit rates are already fixed).  However, the increase in the unsecured household debt, 
e.g. through increased availability of credit cards, should also be a concern since higher 
levels of debt to income increase the probability of defaults.  
 In summary, the literature has advanced a number of arguments that distinguish 
(with more or less clarity) between the effects of rapid growth in household credit and in 
corporate credit. Also, the literature has investigated empirically the combined effect of 
these two types of credit on both currency and banking crises. In the following sections 
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we perform empirical tests of the effect of credit expansions on crises differentiating 
between household and firm credit.   
 
3. Data Description 
3.1 Household and firm credit 
The available data sources used by the profession provide the aggregate value of 
credit to the private sector but do not distinguish between its household and firm credit 
components. Therefore, we use data from the national central bank reports of emerging 
market economies where historical disaggregated credit data are available. Our dataset 
includes the following 13 countries: Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Pakistan, South Africa, South Korea, Russia, Thailand, Turkey and Uruguay.4 
Although we use national sources, the definitions for the household and firm credit are 
consistent across countries. Specifically, household credit includes housing and consumer 
credit from deposit banks to households.5 The firm credit variable includes credit to non-
financial corporations from deposit banks. Table 1 shows the labels and the time periods 
for household and firm credit and Table 2 shows the levels of household and firm credit 
as percent of GDP for each country in the sample.   
We measure the growth in household and firm credit as the two years moving 
average of the rate of change in the household and firm credit to GDP ratios. For 
example, the reported 0.55 growth in household credit for Argentina in Table 3 means 
that household credit as percent of GDP has been expanding by 0.55 percentage points on 
average during the sample years. Taking an average of 2 or 3 years is customary in the 
                                                 
4 Not all countries report data on the two types of credit. Furthermore, we excluded Nigeria since the data 
had several intervals of missing observations.  
5 In most countries these two components of household credit are not given separately. 
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literature (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 1997; Rodrik and Velasco 1999). We 
obtained similar results using a one year growth rate.  
Table 3 shows that while the average growth in the household credit to GDP ratio 
was positive (0.25), the growth in the firm credit to GDP ratio was essentially zero. 
Hence, household credit is increasing in size relative to firm credit. Note also that while 
the correlation of the growth in household credit and the growth in firm credit is positive, 
it is not large (only 0.33). Hence, household credit expansions do not necessarily occur 
alongside firm credit expansions.    
 
3.2 Defining Banking Crisis 
In constructing our banking crisis variable, we used primarily two studies, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) and Caprio and Klingebiel (2003). Demirguc-
Kunt and Detragiache (1997) identify an episode of distress as a full-fledged crisis if at 
least one of the following conditions apply: the ratio of nonperforming assets to total 
assets in the banking system exceeds 10%; the cost to rescue operations is at least 2% of 
GDP; banking sector problems resulted in a large scale nationalization of banks, or 
generalized deposit guarantees were enacted by the government in response to the crisis.  
However, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) do not consider the countries 
and the periods in which we are particularly interested. By using their definitions, we 
constructed our banking crisis variable using the information available via Caprio and 
Klingebiel (2003). A banking crisis is deemed to have occurred for a given year if the 
situation in the banking system satisfies one of the criteria that are mentioned above. To 
avoid capturing the same banking crisis period, we treat any financial distress period in 
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the following year as part of the same banking crisis. Using this methodology, we 
identify 11 banking crises.   
3.3 Defining Currency Crisis 
 In general, a currency crisis is characterized by various events, such as a sharp 
depreciation of the exchange rate, a reduction in foreign exchange reserves or an increase 
in interest rates. In this paper, we define a currency crisis in two ways6: (1) a weighted 
average of the depreciation of the exchange rate and reserve losses and (2) the 
depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. To measure the exchange rate, we use the 
percentage change in the exchange rate of the national currency per US$. For the first 
definition, the weights are chosen so that the two components of the index have the same 
conditional variance7. The weighted average of the two components exceeding its sample 
mean by two standard deviations or more is classified as a currency crisis.  
For the second definition, a currency crisis is defined as a nominal depreciation of 
at least 25%. This cut-off point is arbitrary; however it is consistent with the literature 
(Frankel and Rose 1996). To ensure that we do not consider each of the consecutive years 
that satisfies our criteria, we require that the change in the exchange rate not only exceeds 
25%, but exceeds the previous year’s change in the exchange rate by a margin of at least 
10%. For each country-year in our sample, we define a currency crisis for a given year if 
the currency for any month of that year satisfies one of our currency crisis definitions. To 
reduce the chances of coding the continuation of the same currency crisis episode, we 
treat any similar threshold point reached in the following year as a part of the same 
currency crisis. With this methodology, we identify 12 crises using our first definition 
                                                 
6 We are using the same definitions as Hong and Tornell (2005), which are widely used in the currency 
crises literature.  
7 The weights are chosen in the same way as Kaminsky, Lizonda and Reinhart (1998).  
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and 13 crises by the second definition. A list of the banking and currency crisis episodes 
is presented in Tables 4 and 5, respectively.  
4.  Empirical Model 
 We begin our analysis by estimating the effects of household and firm credit 
growth, along with several control variables commonly used in the literature (Demirguc-
Kunt and Detragiache 1997), on the probability of banking crises. In particular, we 
estimate the following equation: 
 
Banking Crisis it = α + β1*HH Credit Growth it + β2*Firm Credit Growth it + 
      + β3*Bank Reserves/Bank Assets it + β4*M2/International Reserves it +             (1) 
      + β5*GDP Growth it + ui + εit 
 
where i denotes country i and t denotes the time periods. We expect the M2 to 
international reserves ratio to affect the probability of a banking crisis positively whereas 
the bank reserves to bank assets ratio to affect the probability of a crisis negatively. 
Similarly, we expect to find a negative effect of real GDP growth on banking crises as 
greater GDP growth reflects positive macroeconomic developments in a country. We 
expect that household and firm credit growth increase the likelihood of a banking crisis.   
Our estimation equation for currency crises includes household and firm credit 
growth and control variables selected on the basis of economic theory as well as recent 
findings of the empirical literature (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999): 
Currency Crisis it = μ + γ1*HH Credit Growth it + γ2*Firm Credit Growth it + 
      + γ3*Debt/GDPit + γ4*Current Account Balanceit +                      (2) 
 11
      + γ5*GDP Growth it + γ5*M2/International Reserves it + νi + eit 
 
We expect to find a negative effect of GDP growth and the current account 
balance to GDP ratios on the probability of currency crises. The debt to GDP ratio, the 
M2 to international reserves ratio, and credit growth are expected to have positive 
effects.8  
We estimate equations (1) and (2) with two additional specifications of credit 
growth. First, we estimate the equations using the growth of household and firm credit 
growth combined. This provides a benchmark estimate similar to the estimations 
performed in the literature. Then we decompose credit into household credit and firm 
credit. Second, we interact the household and firm credit growth variables with a measure 
of savings rates to investigate whether the effect of credit growth is different in countries 
with a low/high savings rate. We create a dummy variable for countries with a high 
savings rate, which equals 1 if the average savings to GDP ratio during the 1976 to 2004 
period is above the mean of our sample and zero otherwise.9 Table 6 shows that in our 
sample, the countries that have traditionally low savings rates are mainly Latin American 
countries, India, Pakistan, Turkey, and South Africa. 
Our dependent variables are binary (0 = no crisis and 1 = crisis) and therefore we 
use a binary choice model. We estimate equations (1) and (2) using a logit model with 
country-specific random effects as well as a logit model utilizing population-averages. 
                                                 
8 Because of our limited sample size, we try to be as parsimonious as possible. In addition to the variables 
in equation (2), we also used the short-term debt to total debt ratio and a measure of real exchange rate 
appreciation as independent variables. These two variables were not statistically significant and their 
inclusion did not affect substantially the remaining coefficient estimates. In addition to the variables in 
equation (1), we also introduce the real interest rate and GDP per capita, which did not have a statistically 
significant effect on banking crises.  
9 We use the historical savings rates to group our data in order to avoid a potential endogeneity problem, 
i.e. causality running from credit availability to saving rates.  
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One advantage of using the population-averaged method is that it allows us to use the 
Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance that produces valid standard errors. Robust 
standard errors are calculated by the generalized estimating equations (GEE) approach. 10  
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Credit Expansions and Banking Crises  
 Table 7 presents the results for banking crises. For our baseline specification 
estimated with the household and firm credit growth combined, the results show that total 
credit growth is statistically significant at the 1% level and has the expected positive sign. 
This result is in line with the literature that shows a positive effect of private credit 
growth on the likelihood of a banking crisis. Regarding our control variables, GDP 
growth is significant at the 1% level with the expected negative sign. Conversely, the M2 
to international reserves ratio and the bank reserves to total assets ratios do not have a 
statistically significant effect on the likelihood of banking crises in our sample.11  
Now, we turn our attention to the variables of primary interest: household and 
firm credit growth. Once we decompose the private credit growth into firm and 
household credit growth, we find a positive and statistically significant effect of both 
variables using both estimation methods. Thus, household and firm credit growth have a 
                                                 
10The relationship between the population-averaged robust estimator and the random effects estimator can 
be shown as the following (see Zeger et al. 1988 and Wooldridge, J. 2002): 2 1/ 2/(1 )PA RE cβ β σ≡ + where 
PAβ  is the population averaged parameter, REβ  is the random effects parameter and 2cσ  is the variance of 
the unobserved effect ic conditional on ix .  
11 For each of our specifications, we ran Hausman tests and could not reject the null hypothesis that random 
effects estimators are consistent and efficient. Nonetheless, we also estimate the models with country-
specific fixed effects. However, our data includes countries that did not experience crises during the time 
period we are analyzing. Using fixed effects eliminates those countries and reduces our sample size 
significantly. Our results for fixed effects are in line with our random effects estimation but with higher 
standard errors.  The tables for fixed effects are available upon request.  
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distinct influence on the likelihood of a banking crisis. Furthermore, the growth in 
household credit has a particularly strong predictive effect on banking crises in countries 
with low savings rates, as indicated by the negative and statistically significant 
coefficient on the interaction term of household credit growth and the dummy variable 
for high savings rates. Firm credit growth, on the other hand, appears to be more of a 
problem in the high savings countries. In our sample these are mostly the Southeast Asian 
countries where the crises were largely driven by booming investments funded by 
domestic and international capital.  
In terms of marginal effects, the results imply that an increase of household credit 
growth from 1% to 2% of GDP results in a 2% increase in the probability of having a 
banking crisis.12 Once we account for the countries that have traditionally low savings 
rates (recall that these are mostly countries in Latin America as well as India, Pakistan, 
Turkey, and South Africa) the effect becomes stronger. An increase of household credit 
growth from 1% to 2% of GDP leads to a 20% increase in the probability of having a 
banking crisis in those countries. Note that such an increase in household credit growth is 
not uncommon. For example, in Turkey the household credit to GDP ratio increased from 
0.21% to 2.36% just before the crisis in 1994.  For firm credit growth, an increase of firm 
credit growth from 1% to 2% of GDP results in a 1% increase in the probability of having 
a banking crisis. For the countries that have high savings rates, namely Southeast Asian 
countries, we calculate the effect of an increase from 1% to 2% in firm credit growth to 
be associated with an increase in the probability of having a banking crisis by 20%. 
 
 
                                                 
12 The tables with marginal effects are available upon request.  
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5.2 Credit Expansions and Currency Crises  
Next we report our estimations of the currency crises models. Table 8 reports the 
estimates using the first definition of currency crises which incorporates information on 
currency depreciation as well as foreign exchange reserves. The dependent variable in 
Table 9 is based on currency depreciation only. Overall the results using the two 
definitions are similar. All of the control variables have the expected signs and are 
statistically significant. GDP growth and the current account balance have a negative and 
statistically significant effect on the probability of having a currency crisis. The debt to 
GDP ratio and the M2 to international reserves ratio have a positive effect on the 
probability of a currency crisis. Columns 1 and 4 in the two tables also show that the 
growth in the total private credit (household and firm credit combined) significantly 
increases the likelihood of having a currency crisis as the literature suggests.   
Now, we turn our attention to the variables of interest: household and firm credit 
growth. We find a statistically significant positive effect of firm credit growth on 
currency crisis with both definitions of currency crisis. Similarly, household credit 
growth has a positive and statistically significant effect on currency crises using both 
crisis definitions and both the random effects and the population-averaged robust 
estimations. Unlike the results on banking crises, we find no evidence that the rate of 
savings influences these results. In terms of marginal effects, an increase of household 
credit growth from 1% to 2% of GDP leads to a 1.6 percentage points increase in the 
probability of having a currency crisis. The marginal effects of firm credit show a similar 
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pattern with lower magnitudes. We find that an increase of firm credit growth from 1% to 
2% of GDP leads to a 0.5% increase in the probability of having a currency crisis.  
 Overall, our estimation results show that household credit growth and firm credit 
growth have positive, distinct, and statistically significant effects on the likelihood of 
banking and currency crises.13 In terms of economic importance, the effect of credit 
growth on the likelihood of a banking crisis is stronger than the effect on a currency 
crisis. Furthermore, the effect of credit growth on banking crises depends on an 
economy’s propensity to save. Household credit growth is a particularly important 
predictor of banking crises in countries with a traditionally low savings rate.    
 
6. Conclusion 
The literature has identified credit expansions as an important predictor of 
banking and currency crises in emerging markets. We confirm this finding and extend the 
literature by decomposing the total credit growth into household credit growth and firm 
credit growth. Our results show that the two types of credit have distinct and positive 
effects on the likelihood of financial crises, especially on banking crises.   
Distinguishing between household and firm credit growth is important because in 
theory the two types of credit can affect the likelihood of financial crises in different 
ways as we discuss in section 2. Even if the channels of the effects are the same, 
empirical tests can show whether the strength of the effects differs. Furthermore, 
                                                 
13 We also estimate the impact of household and firm credit growth on twin crises which are defined as the 
simultaneous occurrence of banking and currency crises. Our results suggest that household and firm credit 
growth have a positive and significant effect on twin crises, household credit growth being more dangerous 
in countries that have higher propensity to consume. In that regard, our results for twin crisis are in line 
with the results from the banking crisis estimation.  
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household and firm credit expansions do not necessarily occur simultaneously. Looking 
at total credit growth does not reveal which component of credit is driving the growth. 
Household credit is becoming increasingly important in the portfolios of 
commercial banks and is likely to increase in importance even further due to financial 
innovations. Also, household credit is growing rapidly in countries where only firms had 
access to credit until recently. Yet, the literature has not paid much attention to the 
macroeconomic implications of household credit. Our paper provides some preliminary 
evidence on the effect of household credit growth on banking and currency crises. 
However, distinguishing between household and firm credit in empirical and theoretical 
studies will become even more important as financial liberalizations take hold and 
financial systems around the world continue to develop.        
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Table 1: Household and Firm Credit Variable Description  
 
 
Country Period Variable used for 
Household Credit 
Variable used for 
Firm Credit 
Argentina 1991-1999 Family & Individual   
Loans 
Primary, Industry 
and Services Sector 
Loans 
Brazil 1995-2004 Housing & 
Individual Loans 
Industry, Rural and 
Commerce Sector 
Loans 
India 1972-1996 Personal Loans Agriculture, 
Industry, Transport 
and Trade 
Indonesia 1990-2003 Credit to Household Credit to Private 
Enterprises 
Korea 1994-2004 Credit to Household Credit to Private 
Enterprises 
Malaysia 1996-2004 Credit to Individuals Agriculture, Mining, 
Manufacturing, 
Trade and Services 
Credit 
Mexico 1994-2004 Credit to Housing 
and Consumption 
Credit to Primary, 
Industry & Services 
Pakistan 1983-2002 Personal Loans Agriculture, 
Industry, Transport 
and Trade 
Russia 1996-2004 Household Credit Corporate Credit 
South Africa 1991-2004 Household Credit Credit to Private 
Enterprises 
Thailand 1965-2004 Personal 
Consumption 
Credit(Includes 
Housing) 
Agriculture, Mining, 
Manufacturing, 
Trade and Services 
Credit 
Turkey 1986-2004 Private Credit to 
Households 
Private Credit to 
Firms  
Uruguay 1983-2001 Credit to 
Households 
Agriculture, 
Industry, Commerce 
and Service Credit 
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Table 2: 
Levels of Household and Firm Credit as percent of GDP 
 
Country  Household 
Credit/GDP 
Mean  
Firm 
Credit/GDP 
Mean 
Household 
Credit/GDP 
Growth 
Mean 
 
Firm Credit/GDP 
Growth 
Mean 
Argentina 5.06 8.26 0.55 0.34 
Brazil 9.01 14.4 -0.18 -0.30 
India 0.83 14.21 0.05 0.22 
Indonesia 10.13 20.34 -0.39 -1.36 
 Korea 47.55 59.08 1.44 -0.35 
Malaysia 17.59 32.06 0.63 -0.47 
Mexico 17.52 30.73 1.03 -0.23 
Pakistan 1.91 12.96 0.006 -0.009 
Russia 0.90 11.04 0.23 1.70 
South Africa 32.81 65.23 0.16 1.08 
Thailand 5.92 37.08 -0.30 0.44 
Turkey 1.95 11.37 0.25 -0.26 
Uruguay 2.48 20.37 0.21 -0.45 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Household 
credit 
growth 
Firm credit 
growth 
GDP 
growth 
Current 
account 
balance to 
GDP 
M2 to 
reserves 
Bank   
reserves 
to assets 
Total 
Debt to 
GDP 
Mean 0.25     0.03 4.32 -0.60 6.35 9.13 7.31 
Maximum 7.08 10.31 13.28 18.03 31.12 34.13 35.40 
Minimum -4.19    -13.01 -13.12 -8.53 1.31 1.56 0.78 
Standard deviation 1.36   2.97 4.47 4.50 4.82 6.57 6.10 
 
Correlations 
       
Household credit 
growth 
1.00       
Firm credit growth 0.33 1.00      
GDP growth 0.10 -0.02 1.00     
Current account 
balance 
 
-0.11 
  
-0.32 
 
-0.24 
 
1.00 
   
M2  to reserves -0.04 0.14 0.06 -0.25 1.00   
Bank reserves to 
assets 
-0.01 -0.06 -0.10 0.02 -0.04 1.00  
Total Debt to GDP 0.07 -0.24 -0.17 0.25 -0.30 -0.16 1.00 
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 Table 4: Dates of Banking Crises 
 
Country  Banking Crises 
Argentina 1995 
Brazil 1997 
Indonesia 1997 
Korea 1997 
Malaysia 1997 
Mexico 1995 
Russia 1998 
Thailand 1983,1997 
Turkey 1994, 2000 
Total 11 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Dates of Currency Crises 
 
 
Country Currency Crises defined by 
depreciation and reserve losses 
Currency crises defined 
by depreciation 
Argentina 1991, 1995 1991 
Brazil 1999 1999 
Indonesia 1997 1997 
Korea 1997 1997 
Malaysia 1997 1997 
Mexico 1995 1995 
Russia 1998 1998 
South Africa 1996 1996, 2001 
Thailand 1997 1997 
Turkey 1994, 2001 1991, 1994, 2001 
Total 12 13 
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Table 6: Saving Rates 
 
Saving/GDP 1976-1990 1990-2004 1976-2004 
Argentina 20.94 16.42 18.76 
Brazil 18.88 18.58 18.74 
India 12.05 13.89 12.93 
Indonesia 26.52 24.54 25.44 
 Korea 29.96 34.71 32.16 
Malaysia 25.86 34.77 30.00 
Mexico 20.85 19.20 19.96 
Pakistan 16.06 14.03 15.09 
Russia - 27.84 27.84 
South Africa 24.78 16.08 20.58 
Thailand 24.94 32.48 28.58 
Turkey 16.47 20.76 18.54 
Uruguay 13.61 13.31 13.46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 27
Table 7 
Population-Averaged Robust and Random Effects Estimation 
 Credit growth and banking crisis: logit panel regression  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Independent 
Variables 
Pa Robust 
Estimation 
Pa Robust 
Estimation
Pa Robust 
Estimation 
Random 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
 
Total Credit 
Growth 
 
0.333 
(0.115)*** 
   
0.335 
(0.111)*** 
  
 
Household Credit 
Growth 
  
0.451 
(0.132)***
 
1.853 
(0.410)***
  
0.445 
(0.207)** 
 
1.822 
(0.594)***
 
Firm Credit 
Growth 
  
0.276 
(0.158)* 
 
-1.106 
(0.297)***
  
0.283 
(0.136)** 
 
-1.081 
(0.419)***
 
Household Credit 
Growth*High 
Saving Countries 
   
-1.292 
(0.367)***
   
-1.277 
(0.594)** 
 
Firm Credit 
Growth*High 
Saving Countries 
   
1.705 
(0.471)***
   
1.688 
(0.548)***
 
Bank Reserves 
over Total Assets 
 
-0.020 
(0.039) 
 
-0.026 
(0.039) 
 
-0.043 
(0.044) 
 
-0.021 
(0.055) 
 
-0.027 
(0.055) 
 
-0.041 
(0.060) 
 
M2 over 
International 
Reserves 
 
-0.020 
(0.080) 
 
-0.016 
(0.074) 
 
0.067 
(0.073) 
 
-0.017 
(0.082) 
 
-0.011 
(0.081) 
 
0.068 
(0.084) 
 
GDP Growth 
 
-0.147 
(0.049)*** 
 
-0.162 
(0.050)***
 
-0.186 
(0.057)***
 
-0.145 
(0.065)** 
 
-0.157 
(0.070)** 
 
-0.180 
(0.077)** 
 
Constant 
 
-2.311 
(0.859)*** 
 
-2.523 
(0.916)***
 
-3.834 
(1.248)***
 
-2.319 
(0.870)*** 
 
-2.534 
(0.825)***
 
-3.809 
(1.111)***
 
Observations 
 
177 
 
177 
 
177 
 
177 
 
177 
 
177 
Number of 
countries 
13 13 13 13 13 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate rejection at the 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent significance level.   
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Table 8 
Population-Averaged Robust and Random Effects Estimation 
  Credit growth and currency crisis defined using reserves and depreciation:  
  logit panel regression 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Pa Robust 
Estimation 
Pa Robust 
Estimation
Pa Robust 
Estimation 
Random 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
 
Total Credit 
Growth 
 
0.402 
(0.142)*** 
   
0.494 
(0.183)*** 
  
 
Household Credit 
Growth 
  
0.611 
(0.190)***
 
0.828 
(0.742) 
  
0.655 
(0.317)** 
 
0.813 
(0.603) 
 
Firm Credit 
Growth 
  
0.317 
(0.167)* 
 
-0.080 
(0.613) 
  
0.399 
(0.204)** 
 
0.020 
(0.368) 
 
Household Credit 
Growth*High 
Saving Countries 
   
-0.184 
(0.768) 
   
-0.150 
(0.663) 
 
Firm Credit 
Growth*High 
Saving Countries 
   
0.518 
(0.626) 
   
0.547 
(0.438) 
Total Debt over 
GDP 
0.105 
(0.037)*** 
 
0.102 
(0.036)***
0.100 
(0.043)** 
0.120 
(0.073)* 
0.116 
(0.070)* 
0.112 
(0.075) 
Current Account 
Balance 
-0.314 
(0.087)*** 
 
-0.334 
(0.097)***
-0.335 
(0.104)***
-0.374 
(0.176)** 
-0.374 
(0.172)** 
-0.368 
(0.164)** 
GDP Growth -0.377 
(0.121)*** 
 
-0.415 
(0.121)***
-0.441 
(0.122)***
-0.396 
(0.120)*** 
-0.419 
(0.129)***
-0.433 
(0.134)***
M2 over 
International 
Reserves 
0.126 
(0.064)** 
0.134 
(0.066)** 
0.160 
(0.075)** 
0.167 
(0.183)* 
0.163 
(0.088)* 
0.181 
(0.088)** 
 
Constant 
 
-4.688 
(1.293)*** 
 
-4.736 
(1.308)***
 
-4.940 
(1.222)***
 
-5.613 
(1.463)*** 
 
-5.453 
(1.460)***
 
-5.584 
(1.478)***
 
Observations 
 
168 
 
168 
 
168 
 
168 
 
168 
 
168 
Number of 
Countries 
13 13 13 13 13 13 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate rejection at the 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent significance level.   
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Table 9 
Population-Averaged Robust and Random Effects Estimation 
  Credit growth and currency crisis defined using depreciation: 
   logit panel regression 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Pa Robust 
Estimation
Pa Robust 
Estimation
Pa Robust 
Estimation 
Random 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
 
Total Credit 
Growth 
 
0.349 
(0.125)***
   
0.458 
(0.160)*** 
  
 
Household Credit 
Growth 
  
0.454 
(0.129)***
 
0.549 
(0.471) 
  
0.531 
(0.317)* 
 
0.591 
(0.521) 
 
Firm Credit Growth 
  
0.303 
(0.160)* 
 
0.025 
(0.452) 
  
0.428 
(0.195)** 
 
0.145 
(0.309) 
 
Household Credit 
Growth*High 
Saving Countries 
   
-0.058 
(0.528) 
   
-0.021 
(0.635) 
 
Firm Credit 
Growth*High 
Saving Countries 
   
0.378 
(0.441) 
   
0.491 
(0.408) 
Total Debt over 
GDP 
0.091 
(0.026)*** 
 
0.089 
(0.026)***
0.083 
(0.033)** 
0.121 
(0.076) 
0.121 
(0.077) 
0.116 
(0.084) 
Current Account 
Balance 
-0.233 
(0.072)*** 
 
-0.238 
(0.074)***
-0.235 
(0.082)***
-0.304 
(0.162)* 
-0.306 
(0.164)* 
-0.311 
(0.163)* 
GDP Growth -0.287 
(0.083)*** 
 
-0.303 
(0.081)***
-0.318 
(0.080)***
-0.320 
(0.107)*** 
-0.328 
(0.112)***
-0.341 
(0.118)***
M2 over 
International 
Reserves 
0.107 
(0.040)***
0.111 
(0.039)***
0.132 
(0.047)***
0.152 
(0.087)* 
0.153 
(0.088)* 
0.168 
(0.091)* 
 
Constant 
 
-4.171 
(1.053)***
 
-4.155 
(1.041)***
 
-4.260 
(0.993)***
 
-5.395 
(1.508)*** 
 
-5.448 
(1.519)***
 
-5.658 
(1.570)***
 
Observations 
 
168 
 
168 
 
168 
 
168 
 
168 
 
168 
Number of 
Countries 
13 13 13 13 13 13 
Standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate rejection at the 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent significance level.  
